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Abstract Cooperative advertising is an agreement
between a manufacturer and a retailer to share advertising
cost at the local level. Previous studies have not investi-
gated cooperative advertising for complementary products
and their main focus was only on one good. In this paper,
we study a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one
manufacturer and one retailer with two complementary
goods. The demand of each good is influenced not only by
its price but also by the price of the other product. We use
two game theory approaches to model this problem; Stac-
kelberg manufacturer and Stackelberg retailer.
Keywords Pricing  Advertising  Game theory  Supply
chain  Complementary  Stackelberg
Introduction
In retailing, cooperative advertising refers to an agreement
between a manufacturer and a retailer whereby the manu-
facturer will reimburse the retailer in part or in full for
advertising expenditures. In a two-echelon supply chain,
the relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer may
be either non-cooperative or cooperative. In non-coopera-
tive models, the party who has more power plays as a
leader and the other part is a follower. The leader is the part
who decides the first move and anticipates the follower’s
move (Gaski 1984; Munson and Rosenblatt 2001).
In this paper, we seek to analyze a two-echelon supply
chain comprising of a manufacturer and a retailer with two
complementary goods. The demand of each product is
influenced not only by its price but also by the price of the
other good. The demand for computer and its software is an
example in this regard. Another example of these products
is Torch and battery. In spite of previous studies, this paper
investigates the advertising and pricing decisions for two
complementary products where the price of each product
affects the demand of the other. To model the problem, two
game theory models are developed including Stackelberg
manufacturer and Stackelberg retailer.
Pricing as an invaluable tool is studied by many
researchers. Taleizadeh and Noori-Daryan (2015) studied
the pricing, inventory and production decisions in a three-
level supply chain. Then, Taleizadeh et al. (2015a) devel-
oped previous work by considering rework process and
buyback of scraped item Taleizadeh et al. (2015b).
Many papers studied cooperative advertising and pricing
decisions in a two-level supply chain. Huang and Li (2001)
studied cooperative advertising between one manufacturer
and one retailer. They did not consider price deduction in
their models. They discussed three models, two non-
cooperative games and one cooperative game. Yue et al.
(2006a, b) considered cooperative advertising in a price
sensitive market. They added price deduction to the pre-
vious models and showed that considering price deduction
enhances the total profit of the supply chain. Szmerekovsky
and Zhang (2009) evaluated pricing and two-tier advertis-
ing model for single product where the manufacturer plays
as the leader and the retailer acts as the follower in a
Stackelberg game. They showed that when the retailer
advertising is inefficient, it is better for the manufacturer to
decrease the wholesale price instead of investing on
advertising in the retailer level. Xie and Neyret (2009)
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developed four different models consisting of three non-
cooperative games (Nash, Stackelberg retailer and Stac-
kelberg manufacturer) and one cooperative game. They
showed that the leader of the game always prefers to make
the follower invest more in advertisement. Jørgensen et al.
(2000) distinguished between the retailer’s and the manu-
facturer’s advertising expenditures and used an advertising
function that was influenced by both types of advertising
expenditures. Just like what is seen in (Xie and Wei 2009;
Huang et al. 2002). SeyedEsfahani et al. (2011) developed
a model in which the relationship between price and
demand had a relatively general form in comparison with
the classic linear relationship. The customer’s demand was
influenced by advertising and price expenditures. They
demonstrated that the shape of the demand price function
may change the optimal values of decision variables and
channel members profit. Aust and Buscher (2012) used
another approach to solve the models in which vertical
cooperative advertising is used between the members of a
chain. Hosseini et al. (2013) developed a multiple objective
approach for joint ordering and pricing planning problem
with stochastic lead times.
There are some papers that studied complementary
products without considering cooperative advertising
(Gabszewicz et al. 2001). Yan and Bandyopadhyay
(2011) studied two complementary products and showed
that when the degree of complement between two pro-
ducts is high, it is better to use bundling policy. Yue
et al. (2006a, b) considered a supply chain consisting of
two complementary products and the customer needed
to buy these complementary products as a mixed bun-
dle. Yan et al. (2014) developed a model with two
complementary products. In their models, marketing
cost was embedded into the model. Wei et al. (2013)
studied complementary products in two-echelon supply
chain. They developed five models, the MS-Stackelberg,
MS-Bertrand, RS-Stackelberg, RS-Bertrand and Nash.
They did not consider the effect of advertising expen-
diture in their models.
In this article, we consider a two-echelon supply chain
consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer with two
complementary products. The market demands of both
goods are influenced by price and advertising. We develop
two models, under Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackel-
berg-retailer strategies.
Problem definition and modeling
We study cooperative advertising for complementary pro-
ducts in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one
manufacturer and one retailer. Complementary products
are those products that are used together to satisfy
particular requirement, therefore the demand of each
product decreases as the price of another product increases.
To define the problem, we introduce notations in Table 1.
According to Table 1, decision variables for the manu-
facturer and the retailer are their prices (w1, w2, p1, p2),
advertising expenditures (qm, qr) and the manufacturer’s
participation rate (t). Regarding the previous studies (Xie
and Wei 2009; Xie and Neyret 2009; SeyedEsfahani et al.
2011), we assume that the consumer’s demand for both
products Di P1; P2; qr; qmð Þ½  depends on price of pro-
ducts P1; P2ð Þ and advertising expenditure (qm, qr) and has
the following form:
Di P1; P2; qr; qmð Þ ¼ Mðqm; qrÞ:Ri P1; P2ð Þ
i ¼ 1; 2 ð1Þ
The impact of advertising expenditure on the consumer
demand Mðqm; qrÞ½  is equal for both products and both
types of efficacies of advertising could influence it
(Jørgensen et al. 2000; Huang et al. 2002; Xie and Wei
2009), which is shown in Eq. (2).
M qr; qmð Þ ¼ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
  ð2Þ
Since the demand for given good varies inversely with
the price of complementary goods, we use a similar
approach to Yan and Bandyopadhyay (2011) such that:
R1 P1; P2ð Þ ¼ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ ð3Þ
R2 P1; P2ð Þ ¼ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ ð4Þ
and the following restricts ensure that Ri P1; P2ð Þ are
always positive:
1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ [ 0 ) p1 þ hp2 \ 1b ð5Þ
1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ [ 0 ) p2 þ hp1 \ 1b ð6Þ
Using Eqs. (2), (3) and (4), we have:
D1 p1; p2; qr; qmð Þ ¼ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
ð7Þ
D2 p1; p2; qr; qmð Þ ¼ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
ð8Þ
Therefore, the manufacturer, the retailer and the system
profits are formulated as:
pm ¼ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
w1  d1ð Þ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ½
þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ  tqr  qm
ð9Þ
pr ¼ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
p1  w1ð Þ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ½
þ p2  w2ð Þ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ  1  tð Þqr
ð10Þ
112 J Ind Eng Int (2015) 11:111–117
123
pm þ r ¼ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
p1  c1ð Þ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ½
þ p2  c2ð Þ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ  qr  qm
ð11Þ
St: p1 þ hp2 \ 1b ; p2 þ hp1 \
1
b
0 \ w1 \ p1; 0 \ w2 \ p2; 0  t  1 and 0 \ qr; qm
Two games model
Stackelberg manufacturer
In this section, we model the problem as a non-cooperative
game. We consider the manufacturer as the leader and the
retailer as the follower in the Stackelberg equilibrium game
theory. Manufacturer takes the action first and then the
retailer moves sequentially. To find the solution, we first
solve the retailer’s problem as follows:
pr ¼ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
p1  w1ð Þ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ½
þ p2  w2ð Þ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ  1  tð Þqr
ð12Þ
pr is a concave function with respect to retailer’s deci-
sion variables so we can solve the problem as follows:
opr
op1
¼ 0 ) p1 ¼ 1 þ bw1 1 þ hð Þ





¼ 0 ) p2 ¼ 1 þ bw2 1 þ hð Þ





¼ 0 ) qr ¼ kr
2 1  tð Þ
 2
1  bw1 1 þ hð Þ
2b 1 þ hð Þ
 
 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ
2
 
þ 1  bw2 1 þ hð Þ
2b 1 þ hð Þ
 




Using Eqs. (13) and (14), retailer’s price decreases,
as h increases and increases as the manufacturer’s
wholesale price of each product increases. We can
understand from Eq. (15) that optimal local advertising
level decreases as the complement degree between two
products (h) increases. When the manufacturer partici-
pation rate (t) decreases, the retailer’s local advertising
level (qr) decreases as well.
Now, we seek to solve the manufacturer’s problem.
pm ¼ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
w1  d1ð Þ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ½
þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ  tqr  qm
ð16Þ
Substituting p1, p2 and qr from Eqs. (13), (14), (15) and
setting the first derivatives of profit functions with respect
to the decisions variables, equal to zero, yields:
Table 1 Notations
di Unit manufacturing cost of products i where i = 1, 2
h The complementary degree between two products
Kr The efficacy of retailer’s advertising in generating sales
Km The efficacy of manufacturer advertising in generating sales
b The sensitivity of demand rate respect to price
pi Unit selling price of product i where i = 1, 2, (retailer’s
decision variables)
Wi Unit wholesale price of product i where i = 1, 2,
(manufacturer’s decision variables)
qr Retailer’s local advertising expenditure, (retailer’s decision
variable)
qm Manufacturer’s national advertising expenditure
(manufacturer’s decision variable)
t Manufacturer participation rate
pm Profit function of the manufacturer
pr Profit function of the retailer
pmþr Profit function of the system
opm
ow1
¼ 0 ) w1  d1ð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bw2  bw1hð Þ½ 
1  bw1 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ þ 1  bw2 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw2  bw1hð Þ½ 
¼ k
2
r 1  bð3w1 þ 3w2hÞ þ 2bðd1 þ hd2Þ½ 





¼ 0 ) w1  d1ð Þ 1  bw1  vbw2hð Þ þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bw2  bw1hð Þ½ 
1  bw1 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ þ 1  bw2 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw2  bw1hð Þ½ 
¼ k
2
r 1  bð3w2 þ 3w1hÞ þ 2bðd2 þ hd1Þ½ 
4bð1 þ hÞ bw2ð3k2r þ 4k2mÞ þ bw1hð3k2r þ 4k2mÞ  ðk2r þ 2k2mÞ  2bðd2 þ hd1Þðk2r þ k2mÞ
 
ð18Þ
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By solving Eqs. (17) and (18), optimal values of w1 and
w2 and the other variables are obtained as follows (The









1  bw1  bw2h
	 

þ w2  d2
	 







2 8b 1 þ hð Þð Þ  z1




1 þ bw1 1 þ hð Þ




1 þ bw2 1 þ hð Þ





2 1  tð Þ
 2
1  bw1 1 þ hð Þ
2b 1 þ hð Þ
 







þ 1  bw

2 1 þ hð Þ
2b 1 þ hð Þ
 








where z1 and z

2 are defined in (‘‘Appendix A’’).
Stackelberg retailer
In this section, the retailer takes on more power and plays
the leadership role. The solution of this problem is called
SR equilibrium. We first solve the manufacturer’s problem
as follows:
pm ¼ kr ﬃﬃﬃﬃqrp þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
 
w1  d1ð Þ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ½
þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ  tqr  qm
St: 0 t 1; 0\qm; w1\p1 and w2\p2
Since pm is a decreasing function of t, the optimal value
of t is zero. pm is an increasing function of w1 and w2 which
means that the optimal values of w1 and w2 are p1 and p2,
respectively, and lead to pr = 0. To avoid this, we use a
similar approach as Jørgensen and Zaccour (1999), Xie and
Neyret (2009) have used. According to their works, the
retailer’s margins for both goods are formulated as:
p1  w1 ¼ w1  d1 ) w1 ¼ p1 þ d1
2
ð24Þ
p2  w2 ¼ w2  d2 ) w2 ¼ p2 þ d2
2
ð25Þ
By substituting Eqs. (24) and (25) into the manufac-
turer’s problem and solving it, we can reach the manu-
facturer’s decision variables as follows (See ‘‘Appendix
B’’):
w1 ¼
1 þ 3 bd1ð1 þ hÞ
4bð1 þ hÞ ð26Þ
w2 ¼
1 þ 3 bd2ð1 þ hÞ





w1  d1ð Þ 1  b2w1 þ bd1  bh2w2ð
þ bhd2Þ þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  b2w2 þ bd2ð
 bh2w1  bhd1Þ2
ð28Þ
t ¼ 0 ð29Þ
By substituting Eqs. (26), (27) into (24) and (25), we
have:
p1 ¼
1 þ bd1ð1 þ hÞ
2bð1 þ hÞ ð30Þ
p2 ¼
1 þ bd2ð1 þ hÞ
2bð1 þ hÞ ð31Þ
By substituting Eqs. (26), (27) and (28) into the retai-
ler’s problem and setting op=oqr equal to zero, we have:
opr
oqr







1  bp1  bhp2
	 

þ p2  w2
	 





Numerical examples and discussion of the results
In this section, we compare the results of models through
some examples. In Table 2, the value of the decision
variables for different values of h in SM model is shown. In
this example, we have d1 ¼ 6, d2 ¼ 8, km ¼ 0:7; kr ¼
0:4 and b ¼ 0:06.
Table 2 indicates that when the complementary degree
between two products is large, it is not optimal for the
manufacturer and the retailer to advertise, and their profits
decrease as h increases.
From Fig. 1, when the manufacturer plays as the leader,
his profit is greater than retailer and the profit of manufac-
turer, retailer and whole system decreases as the comple-
ment degree between two products (h) increases. For large
values of h, it is better for the manufacturer and the retailer
to use bundling strategy to increase their profits (Table 3).
From Fig. 2, when the retailer plays as a leader, his profit
is greater than manufacturer and the profit of the manufac-
turer, the retailer and whole system decrease as the degree of
complementary between the two products (h) increases.
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To analyze the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s decision
variables in SR game structure, we use another example with
d1 ¼ 6, d2 ¼ 3, km ¼ 0:7; kr ¼ 0:4 and b ¼ 0:04:
Conclusions
In this paper, cooperative advertising models are developed
for complementary products. Our models consist of SM
and SR games in a two-echelon supply chain. In this
model, the demand of each product is influenced by its own
price, the price of the other good and advertising expen-
ditures. The results showed that manufacturer’s and retai-
ler’s profit decrease when the complementary degree
between two products increases. When the complementary
degree between products is large, it is better for the
members to choose a strategy that increases their profit.
They can offer different price discounts to their customers
or choose bundling strategy. This work can be extended
under several directions such as considering two retailers
or two manufacturers, several market segments, and con-
sidering leakage between the markets.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
Appendix A: Deriving the optimal values of SM model
By substituting Eqs. (13), (14) and (15) into the manu-




8b 1  tð Þ 1 þ hð Þ
 

1  bw1 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ þ




 w1  d1ð Þ 1  bw1  bw2h
2
 




8b 1 þ hð Þ 1  tð Þ
 2
 1  bw1 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ½
þ 1  bw2 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw2  bw1hð Þ2  qm
ðA1Þ
Table 3 Influence of h on variables in SR game
h 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
w1 9.7083 9.3076 8.9642 8.6666 8.4062
w2 7.4583 7.0576 6.7142 6.4166 6.1562
p1 13.4166 12.6153 11.9285 11.3333 10.812
p2 11.9166 11.1153 10.4285 9.8333 9.3125
qr 0.0248 0.0282 0.0318 0.0358 0.0402
qm 0.2575 0.2269 0.2009 0.1785 0.1591
t 0 0 0 0 0
pm 1.0890 0.9095 0.7663 0.6505 0.5559
pr 1.3217 1.1082 0.9353 0.7932 0.6748
Table 2 Impact of h on variables of SM game
h 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
w1 9.62 9.13 8.71 8.35 8.03
w2 10.70 10.21 9.79 9.43 9.11
p1 11.75 10.97 10.31 9.73 9.22
p2 12.29 11.51 10.85 10.27 9.76
qr 0.049 0.029 0.017 0.009 0.005
qm 0.090 0.054 0.031 0.018 0.009
t 0.5460 0.5460 0.5460 0.5460 0.5460
pm 0.140 0.084 0.049 0.028 0.015














Fig. 1 Changes of manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit respect to the













Fig. 2 Changes of manufacturer and retailer profit respect to the
changes of h in SR model
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Let us introduce z1, z2 and u and substitute into Eq. (A1)
as follows:
z1 ¼ 1  bw1 1 þ hð Þð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ½




w1  d1ð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ½
þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bw2  bw1hð Þ
ðA3Þ
u ¼ kr
8bð1  tÞð1 þ hÞ ðA4Þ
Max pm ¼ kruz1 þ km ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqmp
   z2  tu2z21  qm
ðA5Þ
By setting opm=oqm and







w1  d1ð Þ 1  bw1  bw2hð Þ½
þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bw2  bw1hð Þ2 ðA6Þ
t ¼ z2 8b 1 þ hð Þð Þ  z1
z2 8b 1 þ hð Þð Þ þ z1
 
ðA7Þ
By setting opm=ow1 and
opm=ow2 equal to zero and
substituting qm and t, we can obtain Eqs. (17) and (18).
Note that when we substitute the optimal value of w1 and





Appendix B: Deriving the Optimal values of SM model








w1  d1ð Þ 1  bp1  bhp2ð Þ½
þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  bp2  bhp1ð Þ  tqr  qm
St: 0 t 1; 0\A; w1\p1 and w2\p2
By substituting Eqs. (24) and (25) into the manufacturer








  w1  d1ð Þ 1  b2w1ð
þbd1  bh2w2 þ bhd2Þ w1  d1ð Þ 1  b2w1 þ bd1ð
bh2w2 þ bhd2Þ þ w2  d2ð Þ 1  b2w2ð
þbd2  bh2w1  bhd1Þ  tqr  qm
ðB1Þ
By solving the manufacturer problem, one can obtain:
dpm
dw1
¼ 0 ) 1  b2w1 þ bd1  bh2w2 þ bhd2ð Þ
þ ð2 bÞ w1  d1ð Þ  2bh w2  d2ð Þ ¼ 0





¼ 0 ) 1  b2w2 þ bd2  bh2w1 þ bhd1ð Þ
þ ð2bÞ w2  d2ð Þ  2bh w1  d1ð Þ ¼ 0
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